Current address:

Dept. of Philosophy
University of Illinois- Urbana/Champaign
Urbana, IL 61801
rccummins@uiuc.edu
217-333-2889

    
 
Current Position:

Professor in the Department of Philosophy
University of Illinois-Urbana/Champaign

Fellowships and Grants:

NSF (STS): “Epistemology and the Diversity of Cognitive Systems. Graduate Training Grant, funded for 3 years beginning 9/2002 for 300K.

NSF (STS): “Atomistic and Holistic Learning.” Funded for 2 years, beginning 8/99 for 121K.

NSF (STS): "The epistemology of non-symbolic cognition.” Funded 2 years, beginning 2/98 for 70K.

National Endowment for the Humanities: research grant, "The reassessment of rationality. 8/93 - 8/96. This grant provided summer support for six faculty members, and full support for two graduate research assistants for 3 years.

National Endowment for the Humanities: summer seminar, "Mental Representation." Summer, 1993.

National Endowment for the Humanities: summer seminar, "Mental
 Representation." Summer, 1991.

NSF: "Collaborative research on the role of PDP systems in the     explanation of cognition," (with David Kirsh, Cognitive Science, UCSD). Funded for 6-89 - 1-92.
National Science Foundation Research Grant: "The Semantics of     Cognitive States," funded for 1986-7.

National Science Foundation Summer Grant, 1981-2.

American Council of Learned Societies Fellow, 1981.

NEH Summer Research Grant, 1981.

NEH Research Fellow, 1976.

Horace H. Rackham Prize Fellowship, University of Michigan, 1968-9.

Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, 1966-7.
 
Publications:

Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford: University Press 2002. Edited with Andre Ariew and Mark Perlman.

Minds, Brains and Computers, Basil Blackwell, 1999. A collection of essays in the foundation of cognitive science. Edited with Denise Dellarosa Cummins.

Early Modern Moral and Political Philosophy: Central Readings. Mayfield Publishing (1998). Edited with Thomas Christiano.

Representations, Targets and Attitudes,  Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1996.

Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence: Essays at the Interface. A collection of essays edited with John Pollock. Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1995.

Central Readings in the History of Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant. The major texts from Descartes through Kant, edited with David Owen. Wadsworth, 1992. Second Edition, 1999.
Meaning and Mental Representation,  Cambridge: Bradford Books/MIT Press, 1989. (Also in translation in Italian.)

The Nature of Psychological Explanation, Cambridge: Bradford Books/M.I.T. Press, 1983.
 

Cummins, D.D., & Cummins, R.C.. “Innate modules vs innate learning biases.” Cognitive Processing: The International Quarterly of Cognitive Science.(in press)

“What Systematicity Isn’t: Reply to Wayne Davis.” Journal of Philosophical Research (in press). (With Jim Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee and Martin Roth.)
 
"Unexploited Content," in Graham McDonald and David Papineau, eds. Teleosemantics. Oxford University Press (in press). (With Jim Blackmon, David Byrd, Alexa Lee, Chris May and Martin Roth.)

“Epistemological strata and the rules of right reason,” (with P. Poirier and M. Roth), Synthese (in press)

"Representation and Indication," (with Pierre Poirier) in Representation in Mind. Phillip Staines and Peter Slezak, eds. Elsevier (in press)

"Cognitive evolutionay psychology without representational nativism," (with Denise Cummins and Pierre Poirier). Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence,  15:2  (April-June 2003) Special issue: Cognitive Science in the New Millennium: Foundations, Directions, Applications, and Problems,  pp. 125-141

“Systematicity and the Cognition of Structured Domains,” with Jim Blackmon, David Byrd, Pierre Poirier, Martin Roth and Georg Schwarz. Journal of Philosophy, 98, 2001, pp. 167-185.

“Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality.” in Philosophy of Mental Representation. H. Clapin, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 122-138.

“Truth and meaning":  in Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke and David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical
Semantics. Seven Bridges Press, 2002, pp. 175-197.

“Neo-teleology.” in Cummins, Ariew and Perlman (eds) Functions: New Essays in The Philosophy of Psychology and Biology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 157-173.

“Reply to Millikan,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60:113-128, 2000. (A symposium consisting of Ruth Millikan’s critical review of my Representations, Targets and Attitudes, and my reply to her review.)

“Biological preparedness and evolutionary explanation,” Cognition, 73, 37-53. With Denise Dellarosa Cummins, 1999.

"How does it work?" vs. "What are the laws?" Two conceptions of psychological explanation.  In F. Keil and R. Wilson (eds), Explanation and Cognition, MIT Press, 2000, pp 117-145.

"Reflections on reflective equilibrium,"  in Ramsey, W. and M. DePaul (eds.) The Role of Intuition in Philosophy. New York: Rowman & Littlefield,  pp. 113-127, 1999

"The LOT of the Causal Theory of Reference." The Journal of Philosophy, 94: 535-542,1997.

"Systematicity," Journal of Philosophy. 93: 591-614, 1996.

"The "Rationale-Constraint" on cognitive explanation." Philosophical Perspectives, 1995

"Conceptual role semantics and the explanatory role of content," Philosophical Studies, 65: 103-127, 1992.

"Mental Representation,"  in the Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell, 1992.

"Connectionism, computation and cognition," in T. Horgan and J. Teinson, eds, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, Kluwer, 1991. With Georg Schwarz.

"Form, interpretation, and the uniqueness of content,"  Minds and Machines, 1: 31-42, 1991.

"The introspectionism of Titchner," in J-C Smith, ed., Historicial foundations of cognitive scinece, Kluwer, 1990, pp. 235-242. Reprinted from chapter four of The nature of psychological explanation.

28. "Cross domain inference and task embedding," in Cummins and Pollock, eds., Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence: essays at the interface, M.I.T Press, a Bradford Book, 1992, pp. 23-38.

"The role of representation in connectionist models of cognition,"  in Rumelhart, Stich and Ramsey, Connectionism and Philosophy, Erlbaum, 1991, pp, 91-114.

"Methodological reflections on belief," in R. Bogdan, ed., Mind and Common Sense, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 53-70.

"The role of mental meaning in psychological explanation," in B. McLaughlin, ed., Dretske and his critics, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 102-118.

"Radical Connectionism," T. Horgan and J. Tienson, eds., The Southern Journal of Philosophy (Proceedings of the Spindel Conference, Memphis State University), Supp. volume XXVI, 1987, pp. 43-62. With Georg Schwarz.

"Representation and Covariation," in S. Silvers (ed.), Mental Representation. P. Reidel, 1989, pp. 19-38.

"Connectionism and Computation," Introduction aux sciences cognitives, Éditions Gallimard, pp. 374-394. With Georg Schwarz.

"Computational Theory: critical discussion of Pylyshyn, Computation and Cognition. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18:1, 1988, pp. 147-162.

"Inexplicit information," The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, M. Brand and R. M. Harnish, eds. University of Arizona Press, 1986.

"SOFT: An active knowledge access system," Proceedings of the Oakland University Conference on Artificial Intelligence, April, 1983.
"Analysis and subsumption in the behaviorism of Hull," Philosophy of Science, 50, 1983, pp. 96-111.

"What can be learned from Brainstorms," in Biro and Shahan, eds., Mind, Brain and Function.  Norman, Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press, 1982.  Reprinted from Philosophical Topics, spring 1981.

"The internal manual model of psychological explanation," Cognition and Brain Theory, 5:3, 1982, pp. 257-268.

"PATHFINDER: investigating the acquisition of communicative conventions," Proceedings of the Cognitive Science Society, 1982.

"Culpability and mental disorder," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 10:2, 1980, pp. 207-232.

"Intention, meaning and truth-conditions," Philosophical Studies, 35, 1979, pp. 207-232.

"Could have done otherwise," Personalist, Oct., 1979, pp. 411-414.

"The missing shade of blue," Philosophical Review, Oct., 1978, pp. 548-565.

"Explanation and subsumption," PSA 1978: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, v. 1, 1978, pp. 163-175.

"Programs in the explanation of behavior," Philosophy of Science, June, 1977, v. 44, pp. 269-287.

"States, causes and the law of inertia," Philosophical Studies, 29, 1976, pp. 21-36.  

"Better total consequences: utilitarianism and extrinsic value," Metaphilosophy, July, 1976, pp. 286-308.  With Dale Gottlieb.

"Epistemology and the cartesian circle," Theoria, 41, 1975, pp. 112-124.

"Functional analysis," The Journal of Philosophy, Nov., 1975,  pp. 741-760.

Reprinted (among many other places) in: Ned Block, ed., Readings in the   Philosophy of Psychology, v. 1, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980;  Elliott Sober, ed., Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology, Cambridge: Bradford Books/M.I.T. Press, 1994; in Function, Selection, and Design, edited by David J. Buller,  Albany, NY: SUNY Press (Series in Philosophy and Biology), 1999; Nature's purposes : analyses of function and design in biology, Colin Allen, Marc Bekoff, and George Lauder, eds., Cambridge, Mass. : The MIT Press, 1998; Functions: New Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins, and Mark Perlman. Oxford: University Press, 2002.

"The philosophical problem of truth-of," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Sept., 1975, pp. 103-122.

"Two troublesome claims about qualities in Locke's Essay," Philosophical Review, July, 1975, pp. 401-418.

"Truth and logical form," Journal of Philosophical Logic, Feb., 1975, pp. 29-44.

"Dispositions, states and causes," Analysis, June, 1974, pp. 94-204.

"On an argument for truth functionality," American Philosophical Quarterly, July, 1972, pp. 265-269.  With Dale Gottlieb.
 

"Review of Jerry Fodor: A theory of content. Philosophy of Science,  1992.

"Foundations of Computational Theory," (review of Pylyshyn, Computation and Cogntition), The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 18, 1: 147-162. 1988.

"Why calculators are better examples than thermostats," comments on Dretske, "The explanatory role of content," in R. Grimm and D. Merrill, eds., Contents of Thought. University of Arizona Press, 1988. (Proceedings of the 1985 Oberlin Colloquium.)

"The mind of the matter." (Commentary on Paul Churchland, "Reduction, qualia and the introspection of brain states.") PSA 1984: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, v.2.

"Review of Jerry Fodor, The modularity of mind. The Philosophical Review, Jan., 1985.

"Information and Cognitive Agents," Behavioral and Brain Sciences,  6:1, 1983, p. 60. (Commentary on F. Dretske, Knowledge and the Flow of Information.)

"Reduction and Functionalism," (Review of Austin Clark: Psychological Reduction), Contemporary Psychology, 6:12 (1982), pp. 909-911.

"What can be learned from Brainstorms?" (Review of D. Dennett: Brainstorms), Philosophical Topics, 12:1 (1981), pp. 83-92. Reprinted in Biro and Shahan, eds., Mind, Brain and Function, Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.

"Review of R. Gregory: Mind in Science," Isis, 73:3:368 (l982), p. 441.

"The language faculty and the interpretation of linguistics," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980).  With R. M. Harnish. (Commentary on N. Chomsky, Rules and Representations.)

"Causes and representation," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980). (Commentary on J. Fodor, "Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.")

"Review of G. Pitcher: Berkeley," Philosophical Review, (April, 1979), pp. 299-303.

"Systems and cognitive capacities," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2 (1978), pp. 231-2. (Commentary on J. Haugeland, "The Nature and Plausibility of Cognitivism.")  

"Reply to Hugly and Sayward," Journal of Philosophical Logic, 6 (1977), pp. 353-4.
 
Dissertation:

Programs and Theories of Behavior, University of Michigan, 1970.    Committee: S. P. Stich, L. Sklar, W. Hart, P. Hinman.

 
Employment:

Research Assistant/Programmer, Northwestern University: 1966.
Department of Philosophy, The Johns Hopkins University: 1969-1976.
Department of Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin at Milwukee:  1977-1982.
Department of Philosophy, The University of Illinois at Chicago:   1982-1984.  
Department of Philsosphy and The Institute of Cognitive Science, The University of Colorado: 1984-1988.
Department of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, The University of Arizona: 1988 - 1997
Department of Philosophy, University of California, Davis: 1997 - 2005
Department of Philosophy and Beckman Institute, University of Illinois-Urbana/Champaign: 2005-present.

 
Visiting Positions:

Department of Philosophy, The University of Michigan: 1976-1977.
Department of Philosophy, The University of Arizona: 1979.
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University: 1988.
Department of Philosophy, The University of Colorado: 1981-1982.
Artificial Intelligence Group, Martin Marietta Aerospace: 1982.
Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, MIT: 1986-1987.
Carleton College, Cowling Professor of Philosophy, spring 1993.

Education:

B.A., Carleton College, 1966
Ph.D., University of Michigan, l970

Promotion History:

Tenure and associate professor: 1978
Full Professor: 1982

Current Areas of Specialization:

Philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, espeically mental representation; Language learning and Communication; History of Modern Philosophy (especially Locke, Berkeley, Leibniz and Kant)
 

Teaching Competence:

Philosophy Mind, Science, Psychology; History and foundations of Psychology and of Cognitive Science; History of Early Modern Philosophy (including Kant); Logic.

 

Memberships:  

-Society for Philosophy and Psychology
-Philosophy of Science Association
-American Philosophical Association  
-Cognitive Science Society.
 

Editorial Boards:

Cognitive Science  
The Brain and Behavioral Sciences
Mind and Language.
Minds and Machines
Cognition