Dissertation Completion Proposal - Craig Mataresse
Craig Matarrese, Department of Philosophy, April 2000
I. Description of the Project
My dissertation is a defense of G.W.F. Hegel's theory of freedom, primarily articulated in his Philosophy of Right (1821), and attempts to show that this theory yields the strongest possible justification for the basic principles and institutions of modern liberal society. Hegel's theory of freedom is broad, and is at the same time a theory of self-realization, interpersonal recognition, acculturation, solidarity, and the institutions specific to modern society which make freedom possible. My position is founded on an interpretation of Hegel's philosophy, so it is necessarily preoccupied with some exegetical issues, but I also try to defend Hegel's theory as one which can withstand criticism, and which can contribute to contemporary debates in social, political, and legal philosophy.
Hegel scholarship has entered an exciting period in recent years as it has argued that his views are deep, sophisticated, and defensible, and so contain the promise of a reinvigoration of contemporary liberalism. This revival stands on the shoulders of the many Hegel scholars who, over the past twenty-five years or so, have successfully debunked the various popular myths about Hegel's political philosophy, from the claim that he was a totalitarian theorist or a Prussian apologist to the myth that he glorified war. With much of this turbid air surrounding Hegel's thought cleared, it has become easier to see Hegel in the tradition of Rousseau and Kant and so as a contributor to the debates within liberal political philosophy about the best way to interpret and defend its ideals.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, "Hegel's Comprehensivism," I argue that while Hegel's political theory stands squarely within the liberal tradition, it must be distinguished from those justifications of liberalism which conceive it as a 'self-standing' theory, as a set of principles which does not rest on any controversial philosophical theory for its validity, and so can be agreed to by everyone in a pluralistic and heterogeneous society. Hegel's liberalism is not self-standing, or non-comprehensive, because it rests on what I call his theory of 'freedom as self-realization.' In this chapter, I explain what Hegel means by self-realization, how his central thought is that 'one is free only when one can identify with one's actions,' and how in his view freedom must be actualized in concrete social and political institutions. One central task here is to make sense of the paradoxical formulation that Hegel shares to some extent with Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant, that one becomes free by accepting and identifying with certain limits and restraints. I also try in this chapter to make the initial case that Hegel's theory of freedom as self-realization is a plausible candidate for widespread practical assent in a pluralistic society.
Hegel's political philosophy is also a perfectionist theory, and the second chapter, titled "Hegel's Perfectionism," tries to make this clear. His theory is a perfectionist one because it defends the idea that the state should not aspire for complete neutrality, but rather is justified in advocating a particular way of life for people; but, of course, since Hegel defends liberal perfectionism, the 'way of life' in question will be one which values individual rights and individual freedoms. The sort of life Hegel thinks the state can advocate is one in which a person has various self-identities, each realized in different institutional contexts, e.g., the family or the market, but where there is some development in a person's self-understanding towards an appreciation of the general good of the whole society. That is to say, the Hegelian citizen understands that she or he lives in the context of a society of other people, each of which has a right to develop individually, but where all must live together. Hegel's perfectionism is unique in that it pays special attention to the social and political institutions which allow for the development of individuals' self-understanding towards a politics of the common good. The central context for this process of education and acculturation is the voluntary association in the context of civil society, and so, this chapter explores the dynamics and normative structure of this kind of group.
The third chapter, "Hegel and Sartre on Reciprocity, Mediation, and Solidarity," answers a strong critic of the Hegelian view I have been developing. Jean-Paul Sartre argues in his book, The Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), that Hegel's view is insufficiently concrete and fails to take account of the individual's actual experience in political groups and institutions. Sartre's criticisms are powerful and important because they are informed by his theory of groups, which goes well beyond Hegel's own comments on the matter, and are guided by Sartre's reaction to the political events and conditions of the twentieth century. I argue, however, that Hegel's theory can be developed to answer Sartre's concerns. A Hegelian theory of freedom can explain how the structures of group involvement are genuinely internal to the group, how the situated comprehension of the bonds of solidarity guides individual action, and how one experiences being an individual and a group member at the same time.
Chapter four is titled "The Disorientations of Postmodern Bourgeois Liberalism." Whereas in the previous chapters, I have been primarily concerned to lay out and defend my interpretation of Hegel's political philosophy, in this chapter, I directly confront the rival and antithetical current in contemporary liberalism that is developed and defended by Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (1991), Essays on Heidegger and Others (1991), Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America (1998), and Philosophy and Social Hope (1999). In my view, there are two main problems with Rorty's view: i) his conception of individual expressive uniqueness is incoherent on its own terms, and ii) his conception of solidarity does not make intelligible the sorts of commitments people have to each other and so can only lead people towards detached spectatorship. An important part of this second argument is my defense of the claim that, despite the tendency of Rorty's readers to take him to be a kind of pragmatic neo-Hegelian, Rorty has abandoned Hegel's insights about how people become free only through actual participation in social and political institutions.
The fifth and final chapter fits under the rubric of the philosophy of law, and serves to bring the Hegelian view I have developed in previous chapters to bear on central contemporary debates in this area. The chapter addresses two specific legal issues: i) regarding the First Amendment case law which bears on the affordages and limitations of corporations and individuals to engage in political speech, I argue that the influence of wealth in politics is extreme and that unless the vestiges of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) and its companion cases are overcome, we will be left with a system that favors incumbents, disadvantages third parties, and allows for the general distortion of primary First Amendment values, and ii) regarding the development of labor law since the Wagner Act of 1935 (also called the National Labor Relations Act), I argue that two cases, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. (1938), concerning the permanent replacement of striking workers, and Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB (1964), regarding workplace democracy, betrayed fundamental liberal values and should have been decided otherwise. In both cases, it is the Hegelian view I have been developing in previous chapters that enables and directs my legal analysis.
II. State of Completion
At this time, chapters one, two, and three are in penultimate draft form, by which I mean that they are written, but will be subjected to multiple revisions. These revisions, though, will not change the basic structure or argument of the chapters. Chapter four is in a state of uneven development, with some sections needing very little revision and others in need of substantial reworking. Chapter five is the least developed of all the chapters, but I do have a substantial outline, and most of the legal research has already been completed through course work in the College of Law. As I see it, if I were freed from teaching and other related responsibilities during the academic year 2000 - 2001, I would be able to have a developed and polished draft of the entire dissertation by the end of Fall semester, and would then be in a position to spend the Spring semester working out final revisions and schedule my defense in May.
III. Departmental Support
I started the doctoral program in the Department of Philosophy in the Fall of the academic year of 1994-1995, and had a University Fellowship as well as a Teaching Assistantship for that year. For the academic years of 1995-1996 through the present year 1999-2000, I have held a Teaching Assistantship, and for the years of 1997-1998 through 1999-2000, I have also had a Research Assistantship. I also taught a course in the Summer semester of 1999, and took on an overload appointment (66%) in the Fall semester of this academic year. I have not applied for any outside grants to support my research and writing.
